X-games

Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

What is common to the following situations: designing random incentive schemes to implement team effort, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which captures these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)93-100
Number of pages8
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume89
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2015

Funding

FundersFunder number
Economic and Social Research CouncilES/L500343/1
European Commission230251

    Keywords

    • C72
    • Externalities
    • Strategic complements
    • Strategic substitutes

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