Why can’t we agree on when governments can consent to external intervention? A theoretical inquiry

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Abstract

Governments may lawfully request assistance from other states in many instances. However, once a government is challenged internally, things become complex. The key question is when, if at all, governments possess the legal authority to invite assistance against armed opposition? This article does not answer this question doctrinally or normatively. Rather, it explores why it remains so difficult to resolve, by utilising three theoretical approaches to international law: instrumental, critical, and ethical. Instrumentally, it is difficult to agree on desirable outcomes, or on a general standard on authority that would achieve them. From a critical perspective, standards on authority collapse into politics. Ethically, the question of authority to consent is entangled with the authority to resort to force internally, an issue scantly addressed by international law. Ultimately, this article seeks to uncover key theoretical problems that must be overcome in order to defend a plausible standard on authority to consent.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)5-25
Number of pages21
JournalJournal on the Use of Force and International Law
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2 Jan 2020

Keywords

  • International law
  • consent
  • intervention
  • jus ad bellum
  • theory of international law
  • use of force

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