Who’s Afraid of Disagreement about Disagreement?

Ruth Weintraub*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper is not concerned with the (amply discussed) question as to the rational response to peer disagreement. Instead, it addresses a (considerably less often debated) problem to which many views about the (epistemic) significance of disagreement are vulnerable (to some extent or another): self-undermining. I reject several answers that have been proposed in the literature, defend one that has been offered (by meeting objections to it), and show that in its light, the prevalent assumption that the ‘equal-weight view’, a prominent view about disagreement, rationally requires us to suspend judgement about contentious matters, is seen to be too pessimistic.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)346-360
Number of pages15
JournalInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2023


FundersFunder number
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme870883


    • Peer disagreement
    • Right Reasons view
    • conciliationism
    • scepticism
    • self-undermining


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