Who Is Afraid of the Logical Problem in Meta-Ethics?

Ruth Weintraub*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Expressivism, as applied to a certain class of statements, evaluative ones, for instance, is constituted by two doctrines, only the first of which will concern me in this paper. Evaluative statements, according to this doctrine, aren't propositional (susceptible of truth or falsity). In this paper, I will argue that one of the vexing problems (that I label the "logical problem") this doctrine engenders for the expressivist is equally pressing for some cognitivists (who think evaluative statements do have a truth-value). I will present the difficulty and argue that some constructivists, who are cognitivists, cannot contend with it at all, and others must resort to more complex ways than the one available to other cognitivists.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)411-426
Number of pages16
JournalDisputatio
Volume14
Issue number67
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2022

Keywords

  • Frege-Geach
  • cognitivism
  • expressivism
  • meta-ethics

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