When the players are not expectation maximizers

Amos Fiat*, Christos Papadimitriou

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

25 Scopus citations


Much of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium concept, is based on the assumption that players are expectation maximizers. It is known that if players are risk averse, games may no longer have Nash equilibria [11,6]. We show that 1 Under risk aversion (convex risk valuations), and for almost all games, there are no mixed Nash equilibria, and thus either there is a pure equilibrium or there are no equilibria at all, and, 1 For a variety of important valuations other than expectation, it is NP-complete to determine if games between such players have a Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Proceedings
Number of pages14
StatePublished - 2010
Event3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2010 - Athens, Greece
Duration: 18 Oct 201020 Oct 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6386 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2010


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