When negotiators with honest reputations are less (and more) likely to be deceived

Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli*, Liron Har-Vardi, Simone Moran

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

14 Scopus citations


Building upon the ability, benevolence, and integrity model of trustworthiness, we examine the impact of three corresponding, commendable negotiator reputations– proficient, friendly, and honest– on deception in negotiation. We primarily differentiate between honest and friendly reputations, which are both seemingly cooperative and often tangled in past literature. We found that honest versus friendly (or proficient) reputations enhance integrity-based trust and curtail deception. We further found that anticipated emotions (namely, intensified guilt and reduced pride) associated with lying, as well as anticipated positive reciprocity associated with being truthful, play a role in reducing deception towards counterparts who are high on expected integrity. Yet, this advantage of honest reputations disappeared and even backfired when refuted; especially when negotiating with individuals who typically do not lie in negotiations. These findings uncouple the two communal negotiator reputations – honest versus friendly, and suggest negotiators should be particularly concerned about having, and also about maintaining, honest reputations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)68-84
Number of pages17
JournalOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
StatePublished - Mar 2020


FundersFunder number
Kreitman Foundation


    • Anticipated guilt
    • Anticipated reciprocity
    • Deception
    • Honest negotiator reputation
    • Integrity


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