TY - JOUR
T1 - When negotiators with honest reputations are less (and more) likely to be deceived
AU - SimanTov-Nachlieli, Ilanit
AU - Har-Vardi, Liron
AU - Moran, Simone
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2020/3
Y1 - 2020/3
N2 - Building upon the ability, benevolence, and integrity model of trustworthiness, we examine the impact of three corresponding, commendable negotiator reputations– proficient, friendly, and honest– on deception in negotiation. We primarily differentiate between honest and friendly reputations, which are both seemingly cooperative and often tangled in past literature. We found that honest versus friendly (or proficient) reputations enhance integrity-based trust and curtail deception. We further found that anticipated emotions (namely, intensified guilt and reduced pride) associated with lying, as well as anticipated positive reciprocity associated with being truthful, play a role in reducing deception towards counterparts who are high on expected integrity. Yet, this advantage of honest reputations disappeared and even backfired when refuted; especially when negotiating with individuals who typically do not lie in negotiations. These findings uncouple the two communal negotiator reputations – honest versus friendly, and suggest negotiators should be particularly concerned about having, and also about maintaining, honest reputations.
AB - Building upon the ability, benevolence, and integrity model of trustworthiness, we examine the impact of three corresponding, commendable negotiator reputations– proficient, friendly, and honest– on deception in negotiation. We primarily differentiate between honest and friendly reputations, which are both seemingly cooperative and often tangled in past literature. We found that honest versus friendly (or proficient) reputations enhance integrity-based trust and curtail deception. We further found that anticipated emotions (namely, intensified guilt and reduced pride) associated with lying, as well as anticipated positive reciprocity associated with being truthful, play a role in reducing deception towards counterparts who are high on expected integrity. Yet, this advantage of honest reputations disappeared and even backfired when refuted; especially when negotiating with individuals who typically do not lie in negotiations. These findings uncouple the two communal negotiator reputations – honest versus friendly, and suggest negotiators should be particularly concerned about having, and also about maintaining, honest reputations.
KW - Anticipated guilt
KW - Anticipated reciprocity
KW - Deception
KW - Honest negotiator reputation
KW - Integrity
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85078779032&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.11.006
DO - 10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.11.006
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AN - SCOPUS:85078779032
SN - 0749-5978
VL - 157
SP - 68
EP - 84
JO - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
JF - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
ER -