What you get is what you see: Cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ehud Lehrer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider two-player repeated games, where the players observe their own payoffs with a positive probability. Typically, a player observes neither the other's actions nor her own payoffs. We show that when costly communication is available to the players and when they are patient enough, being aware of her own payoffs suffices to provide the players with any strictly efficient payoff by sequential equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)197-237
Number of pages41
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume181
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2019

Keywords

  • Discounted repeated games
  • Efficient payoffs
  • Information matrix
  • Observable payoffs
  • Sequential equilibrium

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