TY - JOUR
T1 - What you get is what you see
T2 - Cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
AU - Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit
AU - Lehrer, Ehud
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2019/5
Y1 - 2019/5
N2 - We consider two-player repeated games, where the players observe their own payoffs with a positive probability. Typically, a player observes neither the other's actions nor her own payoffs. We show that when costly communication is available to the players and when they are patient enough, being aware of her own payoffs suffices to provide the players with any strictly efficient payoff by sequential equilibrium.
AB - We consider two-player repeated games, where the players observe their own payoffs with a positive probability. Typically, a player observes neither the other's actions nor her own payoffs. We show that when costly communication is available to the players and when they are patient enough, being aware of her own payoffs suffices to provide the players with any strictly efficient payoff by sequential equilibrium.
KW - Discounted repeated games
KW - Efficient payoffs
KW - Information matrix
KW - Observable payoffs
KW - Sequential equilibrium
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85062149656&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.007
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.007
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???
AN - SCOPUS:85062149656
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 181
SP - 197
EP - 237
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
ER -