What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

Ehud Lehrer*, Dinah Rosenberg

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs. In two-person zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers for two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided, where only one player is informed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)343-357
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jun 2006


  • Bayesian games
  • Information structure
  • One-sided information
  • Symmetric information
  • Value-of-information function


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