TY - JOUR
T1 - Voting with interdependent values
T2 - The Condorcet winner
AU - Gershkov, Alex
AU - Kleiner, Andreas
AU - Moldovanu, Benny
AU - Shi, Xianwen
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2023/11
Y1 - 2023/11
N2 - We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Condorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly different outcomes if values are interdependent. We also propose a new notion of Condorcet winner under incomplete information and interdependent preferences, and discuss its implementation. The new phenomena in this paper arise because different voting rules (including dynamic ones) induce different processes of information aggregation and learning.
AB - We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Condorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly different outcomes if values are interdependent. We also propose a new notion of Condorcet winner under incomplete information and interdependent preferences, and discuss its implementation. The new phenomena in this paper arise because different voting rules (including dynamic ones) induce different processes of information aggregation and learning.
KW - Condorcet winner
KW - Incomplete information
KW - Interdependent values
KW - Sequential voting
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85168517615&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.004
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.004
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AN - SCOPUS:85168517615
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 142
SP - 193
EP - 208
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -