Virtual implementation in backwards induction

Jacob Glazer*, Motty Perry

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We examine a sequential mechanism which is a simple modification of the normal form mechanism introduced by Abreu and Matsushima (1992). We show that almost any social choice function can be virtually implemented via a finite sequential game of perfect information. The solution concept assumed is backwards induction. In particular, any social choice function that is virtually implementable via the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism is also virtually implementable by a sequential mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-32
Number of pages6
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jul 1996


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