TY - JOUR
T1 - Vickrey auctions in the theory of expected utility with rank-dependent probabilities
AU - Karni, Edi
AU - Safra, Zvi
N1 - Funding Information:
* Partial financial support from funds granted to the Foerder Institute for Economic Research by the Nur Moshe Fund i\ gratefully acknowledged. ’ See Vickrey (1961). For further discussion see Milgrom and Weber (1982). * The first axiomatization of this model is due to Quiggin (1982). Yaari (1985) developed Independently an axiomatiration similar theory with linear utihty. Segal (1984) and Chew (1984) extended these models.
PY - 1986
Y1 - 1986
N2 - When decision makers maximize expected utility with rank-dependent probabilities and the object being auctioned is a risky prospect then, with independent private value, Vickrey auctions lose their demand revealing property. Moreover, they might be non-Pareto optimal.
AB - When decision makers maximize expected utility with rank-dependent probabilities and the object being auctioned is a risky prospect then, with independent private value, Vickrey auctions lose their demand revealing property. Moreover, they might be non-Pareto optimal.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=38249043188&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(86)90071-6
DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(86)90071-6
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AN - SCOPUS:38249043188
SN - 0165-1765
VL - 20
SP - 15
EP - 18
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
IS - 1
ER -