TY - GEN
T1 - Variations on the hotelling-downs model
AU - Feldman, Michal
AU - Fiat, Amos
AU - Obraztsova, Svetlana
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Copyright 2016, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - In this paper we expand the standard Hotelling-Downs model (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957) of spatial competition to a setting where clients do not necessarily choose their closest candidate (retail product or political). Specifically, we consider a setting where clients may disavow all candidates if there is no candidate that is sufficiently close to the client preferences. Moreover, if there are multiple candidates that are sufficiently close, the client may choose amongst them at random. We show the existence of Nash Equilibria for some such models, and study the price of anarchy and stability in such scenarios.
AB - In this paper we expand the standard Hotelling-Downs model (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957) of spatial competition to a setting where clients do not necessarily choose their closest candidate (retail product or political). Specifically, we consider a setting where clients may disavow all candidates if there is no candidate that is sufficiently close to the client preferences. Moreover, if there are multiple candidates that are sufficiently close, the client may choose amongst them at random. We show the existence of Nash Equilibria for some such models, and study the price of anarchy and stability in such scenarios.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85007206632&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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AN - SCOPUS:85007206632
T3 - 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
SP - 496
EP - 501
BT - 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
PB - AAAI press
T2 - 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
Y2 - 12 February 2016 through 17 February 2016
ER -