Variations on the hotelling-downs model

Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Svetlana Obraztsova

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper we expand the standard Hotelling-Downs model (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957) of spatial competition to a setting where clients do not necessarily choose their closest candidate (retail product or political). Specifically, we consider a setting where clients may disavow all candidates if there is no candidate that is sufficiently close to the client preferences. Moreover, if there are multiple candidates that are sufficiently close, the client may choose amongst them at random. We show the existence of Nash Equilibria for some such models, and study the price of anarchy and stability in such scenarios.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
PublisherAAAI press
Pages496-501
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781577357605
StatePublished - 2016
Event30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016 - Phoenix, United States
Duration: 12 Feb 201617 Feb 2016

Publication series

Name30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016

Conference

Conference30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPhoenix
Period12/02/1617/02/16

Funding

FundersFunder number
FP7/2007
European Research Council337122
Seventh Framework Programme

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