Variable Credibility Threats: A Procedure for the Enhancement of Deterrence Effectiveness

Nehemia Friedland*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This experiment evaluated a procedure whereby tax evasions can be more effectively deterred by dividing the taxpayers' population into two, high‐ and low‐audit probability, categories. The procedure employs a rule that assigns tax evaders to the high‐audit probability category and assigns those who abide by the law to a low‐audit probability category. A simple empirical simulation showed that the “variable probabilities” procedure prevented tax evasions more effectively than an alternative, “fixed probability” procedure, in which the same audit probability applied to all individuals, regardless of their past record.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)230-236
Number of pages7
JournalJournal of Applied Social Psychology
Volume15
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1985

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Variable Credibility Threats: A Procedure for the Enhancement of Deterrence Effectiveness'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this