@article{d8ca930546c245928af4816e7b0f48f6,
title = "Updating ambiguity averse preferences",
abstract = "Dynamic consistency leads to Bayesian updating under expected utility. We ask what it implies for the updating of more general preferences. In this paper, we characterize dynamically consistent update rules for preference models satisfying ambiguity aversion. This characterization extends to regret-based models as well. As applications of our general result, we characterize dynamically consistent updating for two important models of ambiguity averse preferences: the ambiguity averse smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [Econometrica 73 2005, pp. 1849-1892]) and the variational preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [Econometrica 74 2006, pp. 1447-1498]). The latter includes max-min expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler [Journal of Mathematical Economics 18 1989, pp. 141-153]) and the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent [American Economic Review 91(2) 2001, pp. 60-66] as special cases. For smooth ambiguity preferences, we also identify a simple rule that is shown to be the unique dynamically consistent rule among a large class of rules that may be expressed as reweightings of the Bayes' rule.",
keywords = "Ambiguity, Bayesian, Consequentialism, Dynamic consistency, Ellsberg, Regret, Smooth ambiguity, Updating",
author = "Eran Hanany and Peter Klibanoff",
note = "Funding Information: KEYWORDS: updating, dynamic consistency, ambiguity, regret, Ellsberg, Bayesian, consequentialism, smooth ambiguity ∗We thank Nabil Al-Najjar, Sandeep Baliga, Eddie Dekel, Jurgen Eichberger, Larry Epstein, Rapha{\"e}l Giraud, Simon Grant, Ian Jewitt, Massimo Marinacci, Sujoy Mukerji, Bob Nau, Ben Polak, Chris Shannon, Marciano Siniscalchi, Tomasz Strzalecki, Kane Sweeney, Tim Van Zandt and especially Fabio Maccheroni for helpful comments and discussion. We also thank the coeditor, Federico Echenique, and two anonymous referees for their comments. Additional thanks to seminar audiences at INSEAD, HEC, Johns Hopkins, Northwestern and Technion and at FUR XII, RUD {\textquoteleft}07, Fall {\textquoteright}07 Midwest Economic Theory, ESNASM {\textquoteright}08, the 3rd Israeli Game Theory Conference and the 3rd World Congress of the Game Theory Society. This research was partially supported by Grant No. 2006264 from the United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), Jerusalem, Israel.",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.2202/1935-1704.1547",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "9",
journal = "B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics",
issn = "1534-5955",
publisher = "Walter de Gruyter GmbH",
number = "1",
}