Unprovable Security of Perfect NIZK and Non-interactive Non-malleable Commitments

Rafael Pass*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present barriers to provable security of two important cryptographic primitives, perfect non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) and non-interactive non-alleable commitments:○Black-box reductions cannot be used to demonstrate adaptive soundness (i.e., that soundness holds even if the statement to be proven is chosen as a function of the common reference string) of any statistical NIZK for NP based on any “standard” intractability assumptions. ○Black-box reductions cannot be used to demonstrate non-malleability of non-interactive, or even 2-message, commitment schemes based on any “standard” intractability assumptions.We emphasize that the above separations apply even if the construction of the considered primitives makes a non-black-box use of the underlying assumption. As an independent contribution, we suggest a taxonomy of game-based intractability assumptions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)607-666
Number of pages60
JournalComputational Complexity
Volume25
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Sep 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Black-box separations
  • Cryptography
  • Non-interactive zero-knowledge
  • Non-malleable commitments

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