Unilateral stability in matching problems

Michael Richter; Ariel Rubinstein

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780

Unilateral stability in matching problems

Michael Richter^*, Ariel Rubinstein

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The canonical solution concept used in matching problems is pairwise stability, whose premise is that harmony is disrupted by any two agents intentionally leaving their partners to be with each other. We instead focus on scenarios in which harmony is disrupted merely by a single agent unilaterally initiating contact with a member of a different pair, whether or not his approach is reciprocated. A variety of solution concepts are proposed in which taboos, status, or power systematically limit such initiatives in order to achieve harmony.

Original language	English
Article number	105780
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	216
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780
State	Published - Mar 2024

Keywords

Matching problems
Pairwise stability
Unilateral stability

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10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780

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Unilateral stability in matching problems

Abstract

Keywords

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