Tye on materialism without phenomenal concepts: Comments on Consciousness Revisited

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In this review article I examine Michel Tye's recent reassessment of the phenomenal concept strategy. The phenomenal concept strategy is employed in the attempts to respond to the classical arguments that challenge materialism. I examine Tye's reasons for abandoning the phenomenal concept strategy (a strategy that he himself advocated in his earlier writings), and I examine the elements of his new position according to which the materialist response should involve 'singular when filled' content schema, as well as a version of the Russellian distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In the final part I criticize the adequacy of Tye's theory not as a response to the dualists but rather as a response to opponents of representationalism from the materialist camp.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)597-606
Number of pages10
JournalPragmatics and Cognition
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2010


  • Consciousness
  • Content schema
  • Dualism
  • Knowledge by acquaintance
  • Materialism
  • Perception
  • Phenomenal concepts
  • The explanatory gap
  • The knowledge argument
  • The modal argument
  • The zombie argument


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