Turnpike properties of capital accumulation games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

A differential game is considered in which players accumulate capital, their payoff functions depend upon the capital stocks of both players and their cost functions are convex. Previous existence and stability results are relied upon to show that the game, under an additional assumption, possesses the following properties: (a) Every equilibrium of the infinite horizon game converges to the unique stationary equilibrium. (b) For a time horizon long enough the finite horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the infinite horizon equilibrium except for some final time. (c) For a time horizon long enough the finite horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the stationary equilibrium except for some initial and final time.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)167-177
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume38
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1986
Externally publishedYes

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