TY - JOUR

T1 - Turnpike properties of capital accumulation games

AU - Fershtman, Chaim

AU - Muller, Eitan

PY - 1986/2

Y1 - 1986/2

N2 - A differential game is considered in which players accumulate capital, their payoff functions depend upon the capital stocks of both players and their cost functions are convex. Previous existence and stability results are relied upon to show that the game, under an additional assumption, possesses the following properties: (a) Every equilibrium of the infinite horizon game converges to the unique stationary equilibrium. (b) For a time horizon long enough the finite horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the infinite horizon equilibrium except for some final time. (c) For a time horizon long enough the finite horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the stationary equilibrium except for some initial and final time.

AB - A differential game is considered in which players accumulate capital, their payoff functions depend upon the capital stocks of both players and their cost functions are convex. Previous existence and stability results are relied upon to show that the game, under an additional assumption, possesses the following properties: (a) Every equilibrium of the infinite horizon game converges to the unique stationary equilibrium. (b) For a time horizon long enough the finite horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the infinite horizon equilibrium except for some final time. (c) For a time horizon long enough the finite horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the stationary equilibrium except for some initial and final time.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=38249042560&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90094-3

DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90094-3

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AN - SCOPUS:38249042560

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 38

SP - 167

EP - 177

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 1

ER -