Truthful prompt scheduling for minimizing sum of completion times

Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We give a prompt online mechanism for minimizing the sum of [weighted] completion times. This is the first prompt online algorithm for the problem. When such jobs are strategic agents, delaying scheduling decisions makes little sense. Moreover, the mechanism has a particularly simple form of an anonymous menu of options.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication26th European Symposium on Algorithms, ESA 2018
EditorsHannah Bast, Grzegorz Herman, Yossi Azar
PublisherSchloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
ISBN (Print)9783959770811
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2018
Event26th European Symposium on Algorithms, ESA 2018 - Helsinki, Finland
Duration: 20 Aug 201822 Aug 2018

Publication series

NameLeibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
Volume112
ISSN (Print)1868-8969

Conference

Conference26th European Symposium on Algorithms, ESA 2018
Country/TerritoryFinland
CityHelsinki
Period20/08/1822/08/18

Keywords

  • Mechanism design
  • Online algorithms
  • Scheduling

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