Truthful online scheduling with commitments

Yossi Azar, Inna Kalp-Shaltiel, Brendan Lucier, Ishai Menache, Joseph Seffi Naor, Jonathan Yaniv

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We study online mechanisms for preemptive scheduling with deadlines, with the goal of maximizing the total value of completed jobs. This problem is fundamental to deadline-aware cloud scheduling, but there are strong lower bounds even for the algorithmic problem without incentive constraints. However, these lower bounds can be circumvented under the natural assumption of deadline slackness, i.e., that there is a guaranteed lower bound s > 1 on the ratio between a job's size and the time window in which it can be executed. In this paper, we construct a truthful scheduling mechanism with a constant competitive ratio, given slackness s > 1. Furthermore, we show that if s is large enough then we can construct a mechanism that also satisfies a commitment property: it can be determined whether or not a job will finish, and the requisite payment if so, well in advance of each job's deadline. This is notable because, in practice, users with strict deadlines may find it unacceptable to discover only very close to their deadline that their job has been rejected.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages715-732
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9781450334105
DOIs
StatePublished - 15 Jun 2015
Event16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2015 - Portland, United States
Duration: 15 Jun 201519 Jun 2015

Publication series

NameEC 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Conference

Conference16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPortland
Period15/06/1519/06/15

Keywords

  • Committed scheduling
  • Deadline scheduling
  • Mechanism design
  • Online scheduling
  • Scheduling algorithms
  • Truthful mechanisms

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Truthful online scheduling with commitments'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this