TY - GEN
T1 - Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents
AU - Feldman, Michal
AU - Fusco, Federico
AU - Mauras, Simon
AU - Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Simon Mauras, and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser.
PY - 2023/7
Y1 - 2023/7
N2 - We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multiparameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an item in her desired set. Unlike most online matching settings, where agents arrive online, in our setting the items arrive online in an adversarial order while the buyers are present for the entire duration of the process. This poses a significant challenge to the design of truthful mechanisms, due to the ability of buyers to strategize over future rounds. We provide an almost full picture of the competitive ratios in different scenarios, including myopic vs. non-myopic agents, tardy vs. prompt payments, and private vs. public desired sets. Among other results, we identify the frontier up to which the celebrated e/(e − 1) competitive ratio for the vertex-weighted online matching of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani extends to truthful agents and online items.
AB - We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multiparameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an item in her desired set. Unlike most online matching settings, where agents arrive online, in our setting the items arrive online in an adversarial order while the buyers are present for the entire duration of the process. This poses a significant challenge to the design of truthful mechanisms, due to the ability of buyers to strategize over future rounds. We provide an almost full picture of the competitive ratios in different scenarios, including myopic vs. non-myopic agents, tardy vs. prompt payments, and private vs. public desired sets. Among other results, we identify the frontier up to which the celebrated e/(e − 1) competitive ratio for the vertex-weighted online matching of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani extends to truthful agents and online items.
KW - Karp-Vazirani-Vazirani
KW - Online matching
KW - truthfulness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85167350068&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58
DO - 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58
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AN - SCOPUS:85167350068
T3 - Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
BT - 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2023
A2 - Etessami, Kousha
A2 - Feige, Uriel
A2 - Puppis, Gabriele
PB - Schloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
T2 - 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2023
Y2 - 10 July 2023 through 14 July 2023
ER -