Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines

Nir Andelman; Yossi Azar; Motti Sorani

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-31856-9_6

Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines

Nir Andelman, Yossi Azar, Motti Sorani

School of Computer Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents. Previously, Archer and Tardos showed a 2-approximation randomized mechanism which is truthful in expectation only (a weaker notion of truthfulness). We provide a 5-approximation deterministic truthful mechanism, the first deterministic truthful result for the problem. In case the number of machines is constant, we provide a deterministic Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) algorithm, and a suitable payment scheme that yields a truthful mechanism for the problem. This result, which is based on converting FPTAS to monotone FPTAS, improves a previous result of Auletta et al, who showed a (4 + ε)-approximation truthful mechanism.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	69-82
Number of pages	14
Journal	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume	3404
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31856-9_6
State	Published - 2005
Event	22nd Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, STACS 2005 - Stuttgart, Germany Duration: 24 Feb 2005 → 26 Feb 2005

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AB - We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents. Previously, Archer and Tardos showed a 2-approximation randomized mechanism which is truthful in expectation only (a weaker notion of truthfulness). We provide a 5-approximation deterministic truthful mechanism, the first deterministic truthful result for the problem. In case the number of machines is constant, we provide a deterministic Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) algorithm, and a suitable payment scheme that yields a truthful mechanism for the problem. This result, which is based on converting FPTAS to monotone FPTAS, improves a previous result of Auletta et al, who showed a (4 + ε)-approximation truthful mechanism.

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Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines

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