Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines

Nir Andelman*, Yossi Azar, Motti Sorani

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents. We provide a 5-approximation deterministic truthful mechanism, the first deterministic truthful result for the problem. Previously, Archer and Tardos showed a 2-approximation randomized mechanism which is truthful in expectation only (a weaker notion of truthfulness). In case the number of machines is constant, we provide a deterministic Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) and a suitable payment scheme that yields a truthful mechanism for the problem. This result, which is based on converting FPTAS to monotone FPTAS, improves a previous result of Auletta et al., who showed a (4 + ε)-approximation truthful mechanism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)423-436
Number of pages14
JournalTheory of Computing Systems
Volume40
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2007

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