Truth, envy, and truthful market clearing bundle pricing

Edith Cohen; Michal Feldman; Amos Fiat; Haim Kaplan; Svetlana Olonetsky

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_9

Truth, envy, and truthful market clearing bundle pricing

Edith Cohen^*, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We give a non-trivial class of valuation functions for which we give auctions that are efficient, truthful and envy-free. We give interesting classes of valuations for which one can design such auctions. Surprisingly, we also show that minor modifications to these valuations lead to impossibility results, the most surprising of which is that for a natural class of valuations, one cannot achieve efficiency, truthfulness, envy freeness, individual rationality, and no positive transfers. We also show that such auctions also imply a truthful mechanism for computing bundle prices ("shrink wrapped" bundles of items), that clear the market. This extends the class of valuations for which truthful market clearing prices mechanisms exist.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	97-108
Number of pages	12
ISBN (Print)	9783642255090
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_9
State	Published - 2011
Event	7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011 - Singapore, Singapore Duration: 11 Dec 2011 → 14 Dec 2011

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	7090 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011
Country/Territory	Singapore
City	Singapore
Period	11/12/11 → 14/12/11

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_9

Cite this

Cohen, E., Feldman, M., Fiat, A., Kaplan, H., & Olonetsky, S. (2011). Truth, envy, and truthful market clearing bundle pricing. In Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings (pp. 97-108). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7090 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_9

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Cohen, E, Feldman, M , Fiat, A , Kaplan, H & Olonetsky, S 2011, Truth, envy, and truthful market clearing bundle pricing. in Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 97-108, 7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011, Singapore, Singapore, 11/12/11. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_9

Truth, envy, and truthful market clearing bundle pricing. / Cohen, Edith; Feldman, Michal ; Fiat, Amos et al.
Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2011. p. 97-108 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7090 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Cohen E, Feldman M , Fiat A , Kaplan H, Olonetsky S. Truth, envy, and truthful market clearing bundle pricing. In Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2011. p. 97-108. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_9

Truth, envy, and truthful market clearing bundle pricing

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