@article{b80189c1e63242f2a253090ff7577857,
title = "Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism",
abstract = "We design incentive schemes for portfolio managers that screen low-skill managers: only the best portfolio managers, in terms of expected payoffs, agree to participate in a single-period investment. The results hold in general financial markets, where uninformed investors face managers of different capabilities, and can only observe their one-stage realized returns.",
keywords = "Investment game, Reward schemes, Screening problem",
author = "David Lagziel and Ehud Lehrer",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.",
year = "2021",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "71",
pages = "483--504",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "2",
}