Toward a Game Theoretic View of Secure Computation

Gilad Asharov, Ran Canetti, Carmit Hazay

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We demonstrate how Game Theoretic concepts and formalism can be used to capture cryptographic notions of security. In the restricted but indicative case of two-party protocols in the face of malicious fail-stop faults, we first show how the traditional notions of secrecy and correctness of protocols can be captured as properties of Nash equilibria in games for rational players. Next, we concentrate on fairness. Here we demonstrate a Game Theoretic notion and two different cryptographic notions that turn out to all be equivalent. In addition, we provide a simulation-based notion that implies the previous three. All four notions are weaker than existing cryptographic notions of fairness. In particular, we show that they can be met in some natural setting where existing notions of fairness are provably impossible to achieve.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)879-926
Number of pages48
JournalJournal of Cryptology
Volume29
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2016

Keywords

  • Fairness
  • Game theory
  • Secure computation

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