@article{ef0b65bdab6946b2bbbf0e5ba8ea79c9,
title = "Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments",
abstract = "Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments where the prize to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce {\textquoteleft}output-dependent prizes{\textquoteright} where the tournament prize is endogenously determined by agents{\textquoteright} output—it is high when the output is high and low when the output is low. We show that tournaments with output-dependent prizes outperform fixed-prize tournaments and piece rates. A multi-agent experiment supports the theoretical result.",
keywords = "Experiment, Principal-agent, Relative performance, Tournaments",
author = "Werner G{\"u}th and Ren{\'e} Lev{\'i}nsk{\'y} and Kerstin Pull and Ori Weisel",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.",
year = "2016",
month = mar,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s10058-015-0184-7",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "20",
pages = "69--88",
journal = "Review of Economic Design",
issn = "1434-4742",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
number = "1",
}