The uncovered set and the limits of legislative action

William T. Bianco*, Ivan Jeliazkov, Itai Sened

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

40 Scopus citations


We present a simulation technique for sorting out the size, shape, and location of the uncovered set to estimate the set of enactable outcomes in "real-world" social choice situations, such as the contemporary Congress. The uncovered set is a well-known but underexploited solution concept in the literature on spatial voting games and collective choice mechanisms. We explain this solution concept in nontechnical terms, submit some theoretical observations to improve our theoretical grasp of it, and provide a simulation technique that makes it possible to estimate this set and thus enable a series of tests of its empirical relevance.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)256-276
Number of pages21
JournalPolitical Analysis
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jun 2004
Externally publishedYes


FundersFunder number
National Science FoundationSES-0241778
Washington University in St. Louis
Pennsylvania State University


    Dive into the research topics of 'The uncovered set and the limits of legislative action'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this