Abstract
The multi-location replenishment and transshipment problem is concerned with several retailers facing random demand for the same item at distinct markets, that may use transshipments to eliminate excess inventory/shortages after demand realization. When the system is decentralized so that each retailer operates to maximize their own profit, there are incentive problems that prevent coordination. These problems arise even with two retailers who may pay each other for transshipped units. We propose a new mechanism based on a transshipment fund which is the first to coordinate the system, in a fully non-cooperative setting, for all instances of two retailers as well as all instances of any number of retailers. Moreover, our mechanism strongly coordinates the system, i.e., achieves coordination as the unique equilibrium. The computation and information requirements of this mechanism are realistic and relatively modest. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions for...
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | BQGT '10: Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory |
Subtitle of host publication | Conference on Future Directions |
Editors | Moshe Dror, Greys Sosic |
Place of Publication | New York, NY |
Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) |
Number of pages | 1 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-1-60558-919-0 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2010 |
Event | Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions 2010, BQGT 2010 - Newport Beach, CA, United States Duration: 14 May 2010 → 16 May 2010 |
Conference
Conference | Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions 2010, BQGT 2010 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Newport Beach, CA |
Period | 14/05/10 → 16/05/10 |