TY - JOUR
T1 - The strategic dis/advantage of voting early
AU - Dekel, Eddie
AU - Piccione, Michele
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others, then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good, then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting).
AB - Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others, then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good, then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84909646296&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1257/mic.6.4.162
DO - 10.1257/mic.6.4.162
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AN - SCOPUS:84909646296
SN - 1945-7669
VL - 6
SP - 162
EP - 179
JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
IS - 4
ER -