The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information.

Ehud Lehrer; Zvika Neeman

doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00133

The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Presents a model of anonymous collective bargaining where the preference of the individual and information may be significantly independent. Bargaining outcomes in anonymous voluntary bargaining; Problems in reform implementation; Reforms in political economy; Balance of power theories.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	309-326
Number of pages	18
Journal	Review of Economic Studies
Volume	67
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00133
State	Published - 1 Apr 2000

Keywords

Collective bargaining
Economics

Access to Document

10.1111/1467-937x.00133

Cite this

@article{1e4245e4545d44ea9c0e46f4b5f49621,

title = "The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information.",

abstract = "Presents a model of anonymous collective bargaining where the preference of the individual and information may be significantly independent. Bargaining outcomes in anonymous voluntary bargaining; Problems in reform implementation; Reforms in political economy; Balance of power theories.",

keywords = "Collective bargaining, Economics",

author = "Ehud Lehrer and Zvika Neeman",

year = "2000",

month = apr,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1111/1467-937x.00133",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "67",

pages = "309--326",

journal = "Review of Economic Studies",

issn = "0034-6527",

publisher = "Oxford University Press",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information.

AU - Lehrer, Ehud

AU - Neeman, Zvika

PY - 2000/4/1

Y1 - 2000/4/1

N2 - Presents a model of anonymous collective bargaining where the preference of the individual and information may be significantly independent. Bargaining outcomes in anonymous voluntary bargaining; Problems in reform implementation; Reforms in political economy; Balance of power theories.

AB - Presents a model of anonymous collective bargaining where the preference of the individual and information may be significantly independent. Bargaining outcomes in anonymous voluntary bargaining; Problems in reform implementation; Reforms in political economy; Balance of power theories.

KW - Collective bargaining

KW - Economics

U2 - 10.1111/1467-937x.00133

DO - 10.1111/1467-937x.00133

M3 - מאמר

VL - 67

SP - 309

EP - 326

JO - Review of Economic Studies

JF - Review of Economic Studies

SN - 0034-6527

IS - 2

ER -

The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information.

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this