The random oracle methodology, revisited

Ran Canetti, Oded Goldreich, Shai Halevi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called "cryptographic hash functions". The main result of this article is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random oracle results in insecure schemes. In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion of a "good implementation" of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)557-594
Number of pages38
JournalJournal of the ACM
Volume51
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2004
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • CS-proofs
  • Correlation intractability
  • Cryptography
  • Diagonalization
  • The random-oracle model

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