The price of anarchy in loss systems

Shoshana Anily, Moshe Haviv

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Assume a multi-server memoryless loss system. Each server is associated with a service rate and a value of service. Customers from a common Poisson arrival process are routed to the servers in an unobservable way, where the goal is to maximize the long-run expected reward per customer (which is the service value times the probability that the customer is not blocked). We first solve this problem under two criteria: social optimization and Nash equilibrium. Our main result is that the price of anarchy, defined as the ratio between the expected gain under the two criteria, is bounded by (Formula presented.). We also show, via examples, that this bound is tight for any number of servers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)689-701
Number of pages13
JournalNaval Research Logistics
Volume69
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2022

Keywords

  • loss systems
  • price of anarchy
  • routing games
  • symmetric Nash equilibrium
  • unobservable queues

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