@inproceedings{99e642da4c2246b4ba9ce46a4fb50276,
title = "The price of anarchy in large games",
abstract = "We present an analysis framework for bounding the price of anarchy (POA) in games that have many players, as in many of the games most pertinent to computer science applications. We use this framework to demonstrate that, in many of the models in which the POA has been studied, the POA in large games is much smaller than the worst-case bound. Our framework also differentiates between mechanisms with similar worst-case performance, such as simultaneous uniform-price auctions and greedy combinatorial auctions, thereby providing new insights about which mechanisms are likely to perform well in realistic settings.",
keywords = "Combinatorial auctions, Large games, Price of anarchy, Smoothness",
author = "Michal Feldman and Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier and Tim Roughgarden and Vasilis Syrgkanis",
note = "Funding Information: Th work of M. Feldman was partially supported by the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant agreement number 337122.; 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2016 ; Conference date: 19-06-2016 Through 21-06-2016",
year = "2016",
month = jun,
day = "19",
doi = "10.1145/2897518.2897580",
language = "אנגלית",
series = "Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery",
pages = "963--976",
editor = "Yishay Mansour and Daniel Wichs",
booktitle = "STOC 2016 - Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing",
}