The Politics of CEOs

Alma Cohen; Moshe Hazan; Roberto Tallarita; David Weiss

doi:10.1093/jla/laz002

The Politics of CEOs

Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, Roberto Tallarita, David Weiss

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Abstract

This article studies the political preferences of chief executive officers (CEOs) of public companies. We use Federal Election Commission records to compile a comprehensive database of the political contributions made by more than 3800 individuals who served as CEOs of Standard & Poor's 1500 companies between 2000 and 2017. We find a substantial preference for Republican candidates. We identify how this pattern is related to the company's industry, region, and CEO gender. In addition, we show that companies led by Republican CEOs tend to be less transparent to investors with respect to their political spending. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our analysis.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-45
Number of pages	45
Journal	Journal of Legal Analysis
Volume	11
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laz002
State	Published - 2019

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10.1093/jla/laz002

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title = "The Politics of CEOs",

abstract = "This article studies the political preferences of chief executive officers (CEOs) of public companies. We use Federal Election Commission records to compile a comprehensive database of the political contributions made by more than 3800 individuals who served as CEOs of Standard & Poor's 1500 companies between 2000 and 2017. We find a substantial preference for Republican candidates. We identify how this pattern is related to the company's industry, region, and CEO gender. In addition, we show that companies led by Republican CEOs tend to be less transparent to investors with respect to their political spending. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our analysis.",

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N2 - This article studies the political preferences of chief executive officers (CEOs) of public companies. We use Federal Election Commission records to compile a comprehensive database of the political contributions made by more than 3800 individuals who served as CEOs of Standard & Poor's 1500 companies between 2000 and 2017. We find a substantial preference for Republican candidates. We identify how this pattern is related to the company's industry, region, and CEO gender. In addition, we show that companies led by Republican CEOs tend to be less transparent to investors with respect to their political spending. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our analysis.

AB - This article studies the political preferences of chief executive officers (CEOs) of public companies. We use Federal Election Commission records to compile a comprehensive database of the political contributions made by more than 3800 individuals who served as CEOs of Standard & Poor's 1500 companies between 2000 and 2017. We find a substantial preference for Republican candidates. We identify how this pattern is related to the company's industry, region, and CEO gender. In addition, we show that companies led by Republican CEOs tend to be less transparent to investors with respect to their political spending. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our analysis.

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The Politics of CEOs

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