The perception of change and self-knowledge: Bergson and Kant

Bergson’s metaphysics and his epistemology are often described as wholly opposed to Kant’s transcendental philosophy. In this chapter, I argue that Bergson’s philosophical project is as much a critical transformation of Kant’s theory as a complete abandonment of it. I suggest that Bergson’s account of the perception of change exemplifies his partial commitment to Kant’s conceptual framework. Bergson indeed rejects Kant’s claim that the perception of change is based on a synthesis of representations. Nevertheless, I demonstrate that his account of homogeneous multiplicity is based on Kant’s epistemic distinction between space and spatial objects. In addition, Bergson held a direct realist view regarding pure perception, but he did not hold such a view regarding the perception of the duration of external entities. In Creative Evolution, and elsewhere, he indeed criticized the cinematographic model of knowledge. Nevertheless, it is in his view a natural and useful capacity that constitutes an essential part of temporal experience. I suggest that in some respects, the cinematographic model parallels Kant’s theory of the perception of change.