The myth of the myth of supervenience

David Mark Kovacs*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Supervenience is necessary co-variation between two sets of entities (properties, facts, objects, etc.). In the good old days, supervenience was considered a useful philosophical tool with a wide range of applications in the philosophy of mind, metaethics, epistemology, and elsewhere. In recent years, however, supervenience has fallen out of favor, giving place to grounding, realization, and other, more metaphysically “meaty”, notions. The emerging consensus is that there are principled reasons for which explanatory theses cannot be captured in terms of supervenience, or as the slogan goes: “Supervenience Is Nonexplanatory” (SIN). While SIN is widely endorsed, it is far from clear what it amounts to and why we should believe it. In this paper, I will distinguish various theses that could be meant by it, and will argue that none of them is both interesting and plausible: on some interpretations of ‘explanatory’, we have no reason to believe that supervenience is unexplanatory, while on other interpretations, supervenience is indeed unexplanatory, but widely accepted textbook cases of explanatory relations come out as unexplanatory, too. This result raises doubts as to whether there is any interesting sense in which SIN is true, and suggests that the contemporary consensus about supervenience is mistaken.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1967-1989
Number of pages23
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number8
StatePublished - 15 Aug 2019


FundersFunder number
American Philological Association
City, University of London
Fordham University
University of Southampton
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev


    • Explanation
    • Explanatory relations
    • Grounding
    • Hyperintensionality
    • Metaphysical explanation
    • Supervenience


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