The museum pass game and its value

Victor Ginsburg, Israel Zang*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We discuss a game in which service providers (e.g., museums) team up in offering a limited time access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the joint income from the sale of passes among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered, the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)322-325
Number of pages4
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 2003


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