TY - JOUR
T1 - The museum pass game and its value
AU - Ginsburg, Victor
AU - Zang, Israel
N1 - Funding Information:
We are indebted to Abraham Neyman, Dov Samet, Yair Tauman, and Shlomo Weber for helpful discussions and comments. Special thanks to the Conseil Bruxellois des Musées for introducing us to the problem. Israel Zang’s research was supported by a Research in Brussels 2001 grant from the Brussels capital region.
PY - 2003/5
Y1 - 2003/5
N2 - We discuss a game in which service providers (e.g., museums) team up in offering a limited time access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the joint income from the sale of passes among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered, the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form.
AB - We discuss a game in which service providers (e.g., museums) team up in offering a limited time access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the joint income from the sale of passes among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered, the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0037716252&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00013-7
DO - 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00013-7
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AN - SCOPUS:0037716252
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 43
SP - 322
EP - 325
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -