The Game Theory of the European Union Versus the Pax Romana

Uri Weiss*, Joseph Agassi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Game theorists recommend the strategy of the Pax Romana: if you want peace, prepare for war. It is conditional aggressiveness. The better alternative is the conditional generosity that the European Union (EU) practices with great success.AQ1These strategies may belong to the game known as the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: peace (or mutual cooperation) rests on a threat to punish; to that end, players should maintain their threat. In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the best response to the strategy of “always cooperate” is to always defect. Yet, these strategies may belong to the game known as the stag hunt. In it, the best response to the strategy of “always cooperate” is cooperating with the other player through each round of the game. The game played by the European Union, we contend, is nearer to the stag hunt game than to the prisoner’s dilemma game. Every European Union country recently (rightly, of course) recognizes peace as best—and thus as better than an attack on a defenceless neighbour that would lead to an immediate victory.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationStudies in Systems, Decision and Control
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages85-103
Number of pages19
DOIs
StatePublished - 2023

Publication series

NameStudies in Systems, Decision and Control
Volume469
ISSN (Print)2198-4182
ISSN (Electronic)2198-4190

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