TY - CHAP
T1 - The Game Theory of the European Union Versus the Pax Romana
AU - Weiss, Uri
AU - Agassi, Joseph
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Game theorists recommend the strategy of the Pax Romana: if you want peace, prepare for war. It is conditional aggressiveness. The better alternative is the conditional generosity that the European Union (EU) practices with great success.AQ1These strategies may belong to the game known as the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: peace (or mutual cooperation) rests on a threat to punish; to that end, players should maintain their threat. In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the best response to the strategy of “always cooperate” is to always defect. Yet, these strategies may belong to the game known as the stag hunt. In it, the best response to the strategy of “always cooperate” is cooperating with the other player through each round of the game. The game played by the European Union, we contend, is nearer to the stag hunt game than to the prisoner’s dilemma game. Every European Union country recently (rightly, of course) recognizes peace as best—and thus as better than an attack on a defenceless neighbour that would lead to an immediate victory.
AB - Game theorists recommend the strategy of the Pax Romana: if you want peace, prepare for war. It is conditional aggressiveness. The better alternative is the conditional generosity that the European Union (EU) practices with great success.AQ1These strategies may belong to the game known as the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: peace (or mutual cooperation) rests on a threat to punish; to that end, players should maintain their threat. In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the best response to the strategy of “always cooperate” is to always defect. Yet, these strategies may belong to the game known as the stag hunt. In it, the best response to the strategy of “always cooperate” is cooperating with the other player through each round of the game. The game played by the European Union, we contend, is nearer to the stag hunt game than to the prisoner’s dilemma game. Every European Union country recently (rightly, of course) recognizes peace as best—and thus as better than an attack on a defenceless neighbour that would lead to an immediate victory.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85159951438&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-27601-9_6
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-27601-9_6
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AN - SCOPUS:85159951438
T3 - Studies in Systems, Decision and Control
SP - 85
EP - 103
BT - Studies in Systems, Decision and Control
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
ER -