The dynamic evolution of preferences

Aviad Heifetz; Chris Shannon; Yossi Spiegel

doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7

The dynamic evolution of preferences

Aviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon^*, Yossi Spiegel

^*Corresponding author for this work

Coller School of Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	251-286
Number of pages	36
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	32
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7
State	Published - Aug 2007

Keywords

Evolution of preferences
Evolutionary stability
Interdependent preferences
Overconfidence

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10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7

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title = "The dynamic evolution of preferences",

abstract = "This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed.",

keywords = "Evolution of preferences, Evolutionary stability, Interdependent preferences, Overconfidence",

author = "Aviad Heifetz and Chris Shannon and Yossi Spiegel",

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The dynamic evolution of preferences

Abstract

Keywords

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