The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules

Eyal Baharad, Zvika Neeman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We calculate the proportion of preference profiles where "small" coalitions of agents may successfully manipulate any given scoring rule and show that it decreases to zero at a rate proportional to 1/√n with the number of agents. If agents have to incur a small cost in order to decide how to manipulate the voting rule, our results imply that scoring rules are robust to such manipulation in large groups of agents. We present examples of asymptotically strategyproof and non strategyproof Condorcet consistent rules.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)331-340
Number of pages10
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume7
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes

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