TY - JOUR
T1 - The Anticompetitive Effect of Minority Share Acquisitions
T2 - Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs
AU - Heim, Sven
AU - Hüschelrath, Kai
AU - Laitenberger, Ulrich
AU - Spiegel, Yossi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - We address the growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may lessen competition, using the introduction of national leniency programs (LPs) as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements. Based on data from 63 countries, we find a large and signifi-cant immediate increase in domestic horizontal MS acquisitions once an LP is introduced but only in countries where the LP is deemed to be effective. There is no effect on non-horizontal or cross-border MS acquisitions. Our findings suggest that firms may use MS acquisitions to either stabilize collusive agreements or soften competition in the event that collusion breaks down.
AB - We address the growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may lessen competition, using the introduction of national leniency programs (LPs) as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements. Based on data from 63 countries, we find a large and signifi-cant immediate increase in domestic horizontal MS acquisitions once an LP is introduced but only in countries where the LP is deemed to be effective. There is no effect on non-horizontal or cross-border MS acquisitions. Our findings suggest that firms may use MS acquisitions to either stabilize collusive agreements or soften competition in the event that collusion breaks down.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85126758286
U2 - 10.1257/mic.20190117
DO - 10.1257/mic.20190117
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AN - SCOPUS:85126758286
SN - 1945-7669
VL - 14
SP - 366
EP - 410
JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
IS - 1
ER -