Subjective games and equilibria

Ehud Kalai*, Ehud Lehrer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

63 Scopus citations

Abstract

Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian, and correlated equilibria to the analysis of strategic interaction requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. The proposed notions of subjective games and of subjective Nash and correlated equilibria replace essential but unavailable objective knowledge by subjective assessments. When playing a subjective game repeatedly, subjective optimizers converge to a subjective equilibrium. We apply this approach to some well known examples including single- and multi-person, multi-arm bandit games and repeated Cournot oligopoly games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73 and C83.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)123-163
Number of pages41
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume8
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1995
Externally publishedYes

Funding

FundersFunder number
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences of the California Institute of Technology
National Science FoundationSBR-9223156, SES-9022305

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