TY - JOUR
T1 - Subjective games and equilibria
AU - Kalai, Ehud
AU - Lehrer, Ehud
N1 - Funding Information:
* The authors acknowledge valuable communications with Andreas Blume, Eddie Dekel-Tabak, ltzhak Gilboa, David Kreps, Sylvain Sorin, as well as participants in the 1993 Summer in Tel Aviv Workshop and in seminars at the University of California, San Diego; the California Institute of Technology; and the University of Chicago. The research was supported by NSF Economics Grants SES-9022305 and SBR-9223156 and by the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences of the California Institute of Technology. This paper is an extended version of "Bounded Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibrium" (see Kalai and Lehrer, 1991).
PY - 1995
Y1 - 1995
N2 - Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian, and correlated equilibria to the analysis of strategic interaction requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. The proposed notions of subjective games and of subjective Nash and correlated equilibria replace essential but unavailable objective knowledge by subjective assessments. When playing a subjective game repeatedly, subjective optimizers converge to a subjective equilibrium. We apply this approach to some well known examples including single- and multi-person, multi-arm bandit games and repeated Cournot oligopoly games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73 and C83.
AB - Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian, and correlated equilibria to the analysis of strategic interaction requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. The proposed notions of subjective games and of subjective Nash and correlated equilibria replace essential but unavailable objective knowledge by subjective assessments. When playing a subjective game repeatedly, subjective optimizers converge to a subjective equilibrium. We apply this approach to some well known examples including single- and multi-person, multi-arm bandit games and repeated Cournot oligopoly games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73 and C83.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0000154388&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80019-3
DO - 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80019-3
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AN - SCOPUS:0000154388
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 8
SP - 123
EP - 163
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -