Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing

Amos Fiat; Haim Kaplan; Meital Levy; Svetlana Olonetsky

Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing

Amos Fiat
, Haim Kaplan
, Meital Levy
, Svetlana Olonetsky

School of Computer Science and AI

Tel Aviv University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article › peer-review

Abstract

As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.

Original language	English
Journal	Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
Volume	7261
State	Published - 2007
Event	Fair Division 2007 - Wadern, Germany Duration: 24 Jun 2007 → 29 Jun 2007

Funding

Funders
Israeli Ministry of Science

Keywords

Game theory
Load balancing
Price of Anarchy
Strong Nash equilibria

Cite this

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title = "Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing",

abstract = "As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.",

keywords = "Game theory, Load balancing, Price of Anarchy, Strong Nash equilibria",

author = "Amos Fiat and Haim Kaplan and Meital Levy and Svetlana Olonetsky",

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language = "אנגלית",

volume = "7261",

journal = "Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings",

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AU - Fiat, Amos

AU - Kaplan, Haim

AU - Levy, Meital

AU - Olonetsky, Svetlana

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.

AB - As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.

KW - Game theory

KW - Load balancing

KW - Price of Anarchy

KW - Strong Nash equilibria

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85174388201

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AN - SCOPUS:85174388201

SN - 1862-4405

VL - 7261

JO - Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings

JF - Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings

T2 - Fair Division 2007

Y2 - 24 June 2007 through 29 June 2007

ER -

Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing

Abstract

Funding

Keywords

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