TY - JOUR
T1 - Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing
AU - Fiat, Amos
AU - Kaplan, Haim
AU - Levy, Meital
AU - Olonetsky, Svetlana
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2007 Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings. All rights reserved.
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.
AB - As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.
KW - Game theory
KW - Load balancing
KW - Price of Anarchy
KW - Strong Nash equilibria
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85174388201&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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AN - SCOPUS:85174388201
SN - 1862-4405
VL - 7261
JO - Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
JF - Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
T2 - Fair Division 2007
Y2 - 24 June 2007 through 29 June 2007
ER -