Abstract
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings |
| Volume | 7261 |
| State | Published - 2007 |
| Event | Fair Division 2007 - Wadern, Germany Duration: 24 Jun 2007 → 29 Jun 2007 |
Funding
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Israeli Ministry of Science |
Keywords
- Game theory
- Load balancing
- Price of Anarchy
- Strong Nash equilibria