Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing

Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Meital Levy, Svetlana Olonetsky

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review


As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.

Original languageEnglish
JournalDagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
StatePublished - 2007
EventFair Division 2007 - Wadern, Germany
Duration: 24 Jun 200729 Jun 2007


FundersFunder number
Israeli Ministry of Science


    • Game theory
    • Load balancing
    • Price of Anarchy
    • Strong Nash equilibria


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