Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames

A. Rubinstein*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The set of payoffs for the strong equilibria is characterized for supergames when the evaluation relations are according to the limit of the means and where no coalition can correlate its strategies in a randomized way. It is proven that this set is identical to the set of payoffs of the strong perfect equilibria. On the other hand an example is given to demonstrate that perfection is a significant notion in supergames where the evaluation relations are according to the overtaking criterion.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume9
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1980
Externally publishedYes

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