TY - JOUR
T1 - Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
AU - Epstein, Amir
AU - Feldman, Michal
AU - Mansour, Yishay
N1 - Funding Information:
Research partially supported by a grant of the Israel Science Foundation, BSF, Lady Davis Fellowship, and an IBM faculty award. Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A. Epstein), [email protected] (M. Feldman), [email protected] (Y. Mansour).
PY - 2009/9
Y1 - 2009/9
N2 - We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games-FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games-GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)-strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members-in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H (n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the Θ (n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal.
AB - We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games-FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games-GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)-strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members-in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H (n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the Θ (n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal.
KW - Coalitions
KW - Cost sharing
KW - Network design
KW - Price of anarchy
KW - Strong equilibrium
KW - Strong price of anarchy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=67651235758&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2008.07.002
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2008.07.002
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AN - SCOPUS:67651235758
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 67
SP - 51
EP - 68
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -