Strategy updating rules and strategy distributions in dynamical multiagent systems

Shahar Hod, Ehud Nakar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The dynamics of the the evolutionary version of the minority game was explored with a strategy updating rule of the of form p→p±δp (0≤p≤1). It was found that the strategy distribution depends strongly on the values of the prize-to-fine ratio, the length scale, and the type of boundary condition used. Agents characterized by p=1/2 exhibited the best chances of survival at asymptotically long times.

Original languageEnglish
Article number026115
Pages (from-to)026115/1-026115/4
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume68
Issue number2 2
StatePublished - Aug 2003
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Strategy updating rules and strategy distributions in dynamical multiagent systems'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this