TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategic information exchange
AU - Rosenberg, Dinah
AU - Solan, Eilon
AU - Vieille, Nicolas
N1 - Funding Information:
The research of Solan was supported in part by ISF grant # 212/09 and by the Google Inter-University Center for Electronic Markets and Auctions . Rosenberg and Vieille thank the ANR Explora for financial support.
PY - 2013/11
Y1 - 2013/11
N2 - We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one's initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.
AB - We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one's initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.
KW - Equilibrium
KW - Folk Theorem
KW - Incomplete information on both sides
KW - Information externalities
KW - Repeated games
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84883749240
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.010
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.010
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AN - SCOPUS:84883749240
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 82
SP - 444
EP - 467
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -