Some new cooperative coverage facility location games

Justo Puerto*, Arie Tamir, Federico Perea

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper we introduce and analyze new classes of cooperative games related to facility location models defined on general metric spaces. The players are the customers (demand points) in the location problem and the characteristic value of a coalition is the cost of serving its members. Specifically, the cost in our games is either the service radius or the diameter of the coalition. We study the existence of core allocations for these games, focusing on network spaces, i.e., finite metric spaces induced by undirected graphs and positive edge lengths, and on finite dimension vector spaces endowed with a norm (ℝd).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationBehavioral and Quantitative Game Theory
Subtitle of host publicationConference on Future Directions 2010, BQGT 2010
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
EventBehavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions 2010, BQGT 2010 - Newport Beach, CA, United States
Duration: 14 May 201016 May 2010

Publication series

NameBehavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions 2010, BQGT 2010

Conference

ConferenceBehavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions 2010, BQGT 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNewport Beach, CA
Period14/05/1016/05/10

Keywords

  • cooperative games
  • core solutions
  • location analysis

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